Has the empire struck back? ‘new paradigm’ globalisation or return to classical imperialism? by Freeman, Alan
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Has the empire struck back? ‘new
paradigm’ globalisation or return to
classical imperialism?
Alan Freeman
The University of Greenwich
June 2000
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2589/
MPRA Paper No. 2589, posted 5. April 2007
  
2001b (12 - Freeman(final revised)).doc Page 1 of 14 05/04/2007 
  1 
HAS THE EMPIRE STRUCK BACK? ‘NEW PARADIGM’ GLOBALISATION OR 
RETURN TO CLASSICAL IMPERIALISM? 
Alan Freeman 
The University of Greenwich  
June 2000 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper conducts an empirical examination of the current state of the world market with a view to 
assessing (and establishing the relative strengths and weaknesses of) two contrasting views: the first, that it 
is the outcome of a process of globalisation, in some sense, and the second, that it is explicable through the 
classical accounts of imperialism dating from the turn of the last century. It considers also the empirical 
relevance of Kondratieff’s and Schumpeter’s conception of ‘long waves’ of growth and accumulation. 
 
It develops the distinction between endogenous and exogenous causes of decline and accumulation in the 
market and argues that they are connected to a prolonged secular trend towards income polarisation 
between blocs of nations characteristic of the operation of the market. It argues that whereas the declining 
phase of a long wave is endogenous and lawlike, recovery is exogenous and contingent, depending on the 
outcome of conscious political intervention. The key to the economic outcome of the present phase of 
capitalism is therefore the political relation between the main players 
 
It argues that history has seen two quite distinct patterns of exogenously-constituted recovery from 
generalised crisis. The industrial revolution, and the post-WWII boom were ‘hegemonically-ordered’ 
yielding high global profit rates under a single hegemonic power (the UK in 1845, the US in 1945) which 
fuelled a general expansion even of its rivals, and yielding rising (if unequal) prosperity, relative peace, 
and political stability. 1890-1914 was different. The profit rate did not recover to previous levels, there 
was no clear hegemon,  growing misery and barbarity over the immiserated parts of the world, and intense 
great power rivalry leading to the wars and revolutions that bestrode the twentieth century. 
 
I argue that the evidence suggests the only possible basis of a new wave of economic expansion is a 
recovery more comparable with 1890-1914 than 1945-1965. The present period is one dominated by the 
steady but inexorable loss of US economic hegemony but with no clear alternative hegemon. This leads to 
an essentially unstable, warlike, and intractable period of competition for domination over sources of 
surplus profit. I call this a return to ‘classical imperialism’. 
 
This article is a prepublication transcript of ‘Has the Empire Struck Back?’ in Albritton, R, Makoto Itoh, 
Richard Westra and Alan Zuege (eds) Phases of Capitalist Development: Booms, Crises, and 
Globalization, pp195-215. London: McMillan. ISBN 0 33375 316 X
 
 
Keywords:  Inequality, globalisation, poverty, Marx, unequal exchange, imperialism, value, TSSI, 
temporalism, development 
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 The idea of this paper is to ask what is happening to the world market. This is an innocent enough 
question and, as orthodox economics often approaches it, the only difficulties seem to be technical and 
empirical: get the data, make the model, feed the computer, and churn out the result.  I will argue that the 
real difficulty is not the answer but the question. The problem is not one of models or techniques; it to 
understand what a market actually consists of. In particular, I will argue, we need to understand what a 
capitalist market consists of. 
 Since 1970, the world market has undergone one of the most protracted phases of decline and 
instability it has yet known. To know whether, or how, this will end, we must establish what conditions are 
required for its ending. Is there a process endogenous or internal to the world capitalist market which can 
restore its stability after such a long period of stagnation? Alternatively, if the conditions for restoration are 
exogenous or external to it, then what are they? But to answer these questions, we must first know what is 
inside and what is outside, that is, where the boundary lies: we must know what this market is. 
 I am going to suggest that: 
(a) Decline is endogenous. A regular process repeatedly leads, over a period of 20-30 years, to 
‘generalised crisis’, by which I mean a prolonged period of slow growth, mass unemployment, and 
political and economic instability. 
(b) Restoration is not endogenous. Exit from generalised crisis arises from political intervention, up to 
and including dictatorship and war, on an ever more barbaric and brutal scale; it has depended on 
the conscious actions of classes and the political power they wield. 
(c) Polarisation is endogenous: The growing inequality between a small group of rich nations and a 
large group of poor ones is a secular trend which accelerates when the world market extends and 
slows down when it retreats. History has reversed Adam Smith’s dictum that the wealth of nations 
increases with the extent of the market. 
(d) The two processes are linked. It has been possible to restore market stability because of the 
impoverishment of threequarters of the world, by placing the labour of the poor countries at the 
service of the rich. The principal goal of the ‘Reagan-Thatcher’ offensive, the destruction of the 
USSR, the opening up of world markets to US capital, the construction of the WTO and the 
triumph of neo-liberalism was to recreate the conditions for such a restoration. 
(e) History has seen two quite distinct patterns of recovery from generalised crisis. The industrial 
revolution, and the post-war boom, yielded high global profit rates under a single hegemonic 
power (the UK in 1845, the US in 1945) which fuelled a general expansion even of its rivals, 
yielding rising (if unequal) prosperity, relative peace, and political stability. 1890-1914 was 
different. The profit rate did not recover to previous levels, there was no clear hegemon,  growing 
misery and barbarity over the immiserated parts of the world, and intense great power rivalry 
leading to the wars and revolutions that bestrode the twentieth century. 
I will argue that the evidence suggests the only possible basis of a new wave of economic expansion is a 
recovery of this second type, more comparable with 1890-1914 than 1945-1965. I call this a return to 
‘classical imperialism’. 
Can the market heal itself? 
 The market as it now exists is a definite historical phenomenon which spread out from its 
birthplace in Europe and conquered the world in the last century: the capitalist market. Almost every 
society has had market activities and institutions such as trading and money, but only under modern 
conditions has the market both become the principal organiser of all other social relations and institutions, 
and an entity distinct from them. Does this market require nothing of these institutions except that they 
place no limits upon it? 
  Trotsky opened the 1923 debate around the law of motion of such a society in the following terms, 
responding to Kondratieff’s assertion that beside the 7-10 year business cycle there was a longer cycle of 
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50-60 years: 
 One can reject in advance the attempts by Professor Kontrad’ev to assign to the epochs that he calls long 
cycles the same ‘strict rhythm’ that is observed in short cycles. This attempt is a clearly mistaken 
generalisation based on a formal analogy. The periodicity of short cycles is conditioned by the internal 
dynamic of capitalist forces, which manifests itself whenever and wherever there is a market. As for these 
long (fifty-year) intervals that Professor Kontrad’ev hastily proposes also to call cycles, their character and 
duration is determined not by the internal play of capitalist forces, but by the external conditions in which 
capitalist development occurs. The absorption by capitalism of new countries and continents, the discovery 
of new natural resources, and, in addition, significant factors of a ‘superstructural’ order, such as wars and 
revolutions, determine the character and alteration of expansive, stagnating, or declining epochs in capitalist 
development.1 
 He thus did not dispute Kondratieff’s facts, and a further hundred years experience has empirically 
confirmed his assertion; the discussion then as now concerns its causes and laws of motion. The key issue 
is whether this periodic variation is the outcome of factors distinct from, and independent of, the 
institutions in which capital is embedded. 
 In asserting it is not, Trotsky asserts explicitly contrasts it with the short cycle which is 
‘conditioned by the internal dynamic of capitalist forces, which manifests itself whenever and wherever 
there is a market,‘ The long cycle is determined ‘not by the internal play of capitalist forces, but by the 
external conditions in which capitalist development occurs.’ 
 But what is the difference between the ‘internal dynamic of capitalist forces’ and ‘the external 
conditions in which capitalist development occurs’? Where does the boundary lie between the capitalist 
market itself, and the non-market conditions for its existence? In studying the distinction I am only trying 
to make explicit what all others take for granted. By blaming ‘government interference’ for market failure, 
neo-liberal economics for example is already, in its very language, distinguishing government from the 
market. 
 The distinction has profound policy implications. The idea that the market stabilises itself 
endogenously is, when one thinks about it, the core claim of neo-liberalism. The basic idea is that the 
market cures its own disorders. Left to its own devices it is perfect and by definition cannot produce such 
unfortunate episodes as financial crashes, famines, permanent unemployment and national destitution. 
These must therefore result from the imperfect conditions under which it operates, such as bad 
government, monetary  incompetence, union intransigence, cultural or historical backwardness; from the 
technological régime, the regulatory framework or the prevailing entrepreneurial spirit. That is, they result 
from circumstances exogenous to the market.  
 Neoliberal policy conclusions are quite logical given these premises: remove all restrictions on the 
market so that it can achieve the perfection intrinsic to it. But if the capitalist market destabilises itself – 
and if, moreover, it cannot restabilise itself – we are led to entirely different conclusions. Not only is it 
foolish to leave the market to its own devices; actually its failure will call exogenous forces into being 
whether we like it or not, whether in the form of popular or national resistance directed against market 
freedom, or political and military measures designed to enforce it. 
 There is then a sphere for conscious human choice distinct from, and superior to, the market. 
Precisely because they are exogenous to the market, these forces are not governed or dominated by it; 
precisely because the market endogenously fails, they are a necessary part of life. Politics and social 
intervention are legitimate, necessary, and autonomous spheres of activity, not limited as in the neoliberal 
vision to simply maintaining the conditions for the market to attain its perfect state. 
 Moreover if the market is ultimately incapable of sustaining itself, then the task facing any 
responsible individual, rather than simply shielding society from the market’s side-effects, is to save 
society from the wreckage of its failure. The problem for Brazil, South Korea, or Russia was not to defend 
themselves against the onward march of the world capital market, but against its violent withdrawal. 
What does an ‘endogenous’ theory look like? 
 Despite the substantial implications of this issue and  although economics is very insistent that the 
market is a social institution from all others, it is extraordinarily vague about where where boundaries 
actually lie. It defines what is ‘endogenous’ algebraically, asking which variables can be determined 
mathematically if other variables have been fixed by the economist. On closer examination, this begs the 
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question. If one economist’s equation makes prices a function of preferences, then s/he has defined these 
preferences as exogenous. But another can rewrite the same equation so that the preferences are a function 
of prices. This is an arbitrary choice. Why treat preferences as external to the market? What is it about the 
nature of the capitalist market that puts prices inside it, and preferences outside it? 
 One reaction is to say, in essence, that the market in principle contains everything. Many attempts 
to explain unexpected market behaviour begin by ‘internalising’ things which orthodox theory treats as 
external. Thus Goodwin(1951) explains the business cycle as an interaction between employment and 
wage-bargaining; Endogenous Growth Theory (see Stern 1996) explains national inequality by making 
external factors like policy a product of market forces; Real Business Cycle theory says cycles propagate 
exogenous shocks, and many long wave theories treat phases of expansion as if technical innovation arises 
more or less automatically out of a phase of decline and suffices with no other precondition to reverse it 
 This does not really address the problem. With enough equations, we could make everything in the 
world a part of the market. But then we no longer have a theory of the market but a theory of the universe. 
The capitalist market is a social institution distinct, for example, from government, and exhibits laws 
which apply under all governments except those which suppress it. It must therefore be possible to express 
and frame these laws without reference to government. 
 I do not claim that the market operates independent of politics or technology. It interacts with 
them. But an interaction is not the same as an internal property. The market interacts with the climate; food 
output depends on the weather and the weather depends on the output of pollutants. This connection really 
exists, but this neither means the climate is part of the market, nor that economics is a branch of 
meteorology. The actual course of the market arises from its interaction with countless institutions; 
precisely in order to analyse this interaction, we have to distinguish it from them.2  
 Nor am I saying markets must necessarily have laws, on grounds of pure logic. I will to the 
contrary try to show that such laws empirically exist, in the form of patterns of market behaviour that 
manifest themselves under a very wide variety of external conditions. The problem is to make sense of 
these patterns using categories that correspond to them; I will argue that this requires the category of value. 
Figure 1: United States Rate of Profit and Capital Stock in Terms of Labour Time
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What does an endogenous law look like? 
 In Figure 1, the thin line shows the rate of profit in the US economy. The thick line shows how 
much the economy has accumulated: it gives the stock of capital, divided by labour employed.3 Both are 
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expressed represented in terms of value, measured in socially necessary abstract labour time, by 
transforming raw data from Duménil and Lévy (1994), using a simple algorithm explained in Freeman 
(1997). However, this isn’t the standard, equilibrium concept of value as it appears in the orthodox 
literature but an alternative which this literature systematically ignores: the Temporal Single-System (TSS) 
or non-equilibrium interpretation of Marx’s theory of value. I applied only one other transformation: I took 
a moving average of the profit rate over seven years to remove short-term fluctuations. 
 Any unprejudiced observer can verify the relation between these quantities. The rate of profit falls 
when capital accumulates, and vice versa. Statistical analysis confirms that 80% of the variation in the 
value rate of profit is explained by changes in the capital-labour ratio. The only substantive exception is 
the period 1890-1910, of which more later. Phases of rapid accumulation - which appear on the graph as 
steep rises in the capital-labour ratio - invariably accompany a fall in the profit rate. 
Of course this does not establish a chain of causal connection; this calls for a theoretical explanation, 
which I will shortly propose. However I want at this stage to draw attention to five points to which the 
theoretical explanation will refer: 
(a) Expressed in value terms, periods of crisis are clearly periods of decline; of negative 
accumulation. But even in use-value or monetary terms it is clear that periods of reduced 
accumulation alternate with periods of expansion.4 This suggests that this alternation is a 
‘genuine’ fact and not an artefact of our concept. 
(b) The law manifests itself. For long periods the rate of profit falls and the capital stock rises. Though 
not always so, this appears sufficiently often, and for sufficiently long periods, to create a prima 
facie case for a relation of cause that is an element of observable reality. 
(c) The phenomenon is largely independent of external factors. The long profit declines of 1870-1890, 
1902-1914 and 1962-1978 took place under very different régimes of regulation, technology and 
government but all took the same form in value terms: stock goes up, and the profit rate comes 
down. This suggests that the connection between growth and declining profit rates is a law of the 
market, and not of something else. It ‘manifest itself whenever and wherever there is a market.’  
(d) Specifically, technical advance does not counteract this law. The periods of most rapid technical 
change, of whirlwind revolution, are precisely those periods when capital stock is rising and the 
profit rate is falling, which is very difficult to square with the idea that technical progress 
counteracts the fall in the profit rate. 
(e) There are two distinct types of expansionary phase. The recovery of 1890 did not re-establish the 
profit rate whereas that of 1945 did. We can relate this other facts: 1890 opened a prolonged 
period of extreme and violent political crisis, and 1945 closed one. A key question is whether any 
new upturn can be stable like 1945-1962 or would be unstable like 1890-1914. At least part of the 
explanation, although stock figures from this period are less reliable, is that a significant element 
of the 1890 recovery was an  additional source of US profits, rather than a decline in US capital 
stock. I will argue that this source was the appropriation of profit by the great powers from the rest 
of the world, for which the exogenous precondition was military and commercial conquest. 
What does an endogenous law consist of? 
 We have presented only supporting evidence for a law that explains generalised crisis. A full 
justification requires a theoretical explanation, deduced from logically-developed properties of the 
category in which the law is expressed. 
 Such an account does indeed follow from the concept of value applied in this paper: it is a law 
linking capital stock and investment which I call the law of accumulation.5 Capital stock grows by exactly 
what is added to it by investment, over any period. Suppose, for example, an initial capital of 1000 units 
and a constant labour force of 300. Suppose 200 of this is profit, and of this profit, 100 is invested. Then in 
year 1, the capital stock must grow to 1000+100=1100. In year 2, to 1100+100=1200, and so on: it grows 
as long as investment is positive. Profit, to the contrary, remains fixed at 200 and even if exploitation 
increases, cannot possibly rise above 300, the amount of living labour worked each year. 
 This is why accumulation leads to a falling profit rate. The profit rate itself, for a given capital 
stock, cannot possibly rise above the total living labour worked in each year. But this is fixed independent 
of accumulation, by the size of the workforce. The profit rate asymptotically falls.6 The only other way that 
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the profit rate can then be restored is if accumulation itself is suspended, that is, if profits are not invested 
but instead, capital is converted into revenue. 
 Normally, investment is positive. But when capital stock is reducing, it becomes negative - 
disaccumulation. This is not the same as the physical liquidation of stock. It simply means the capitalists 
spend their wealth in the current period, a situation that Marx describes as the conversion of capital into 
revenue or the release of capital (Maldonado-Filho 1997). In fact, if technical progress is taking place, 
disaccumulation will occur even if the capitalists only replace their physical stock in kind, because in each 
period, they need to spend less money to secure the same goods. 
 This exceptional circumstance takes place only in crisis. Capital that ceases to expand is 
destroying itself, not least because it destroys the source of demand for investment goods, provoking a 
slump. In this sense we are dealing with a law of the capitalist market, not ‘the market in general’; only 
under capitalism must the market expand to survive, so that accumulation becomes its form of existence. 
Crisis is hence not a suspension of equilibrium but a suspension of growth. This gives precise meaning to 
the idea that the fall in the profit rate is endogenous to capitalism: it can be reversed only by suspending 
capitalist accumulation itself. There are two ways this can happen: one is if the market in capital is 
eliminated and investment is removed from its sphere. The other is if the fall ends destructively as 
investment is hit by falling profitability: this is the source of general crisis. 
A pure law of value: distinguishing value from use-value and money 
 At this point we encounter a complication which I have so far kept in the background. What 
concepts do we presuppose, in order to speak of accumulation, profit rate, and capital stock? Only one: the 
substance that accumulates – the ‘result’ of economic production, or value. Stock is the quantity of value 
in existence, accumulation is the value increment of this stock, profit is the excess of value produced in a 
given period, and the profit rate is profit divided by stock.  
 The law of accumulation is what I term a ‘pure law’; it is expressed in terms of a single substance, 
value, without any external admixture. This is what makes it universal; it also makes it endogenous. It 
applies regardless of technology or monetary régime, just as the law of gravity applies regardless of the 
material of the planets. Technology may interact with this law but cannot suspend it because it cannot 
modify the quantity of value which a given number of workers create. 
 This quantitative absoluteness is not manifested by other concepts of value. If we treat money as 
the measure of value, for example, then as assets get dearer their possessor gets richer, making them appear 
as a source of profit. Similarly if we think of output as a mass of use-values, or quantities of goods, as does 
most of economics, then it will appear that technical progress can increase profits because more goods will 
be created with the same labour. 
 In each such case we are attempting to express a law which applies to labour alone in terms of 
something which is not labour. This is like using a pair of scales to tell us how big a piece of cake is; the 
problem is that the scales can’t tell us how much air the cake contains. Nevertheless all cakes obey 
empirically observable laws determined only by their weight, regardless of their size. We can understand 
the logical foundation of these laws only if we understand weight for what it is, a property independent of 
size. 
 The empirically observable law of accumulation is grounded only when we express it in terms of a 
substance – value – independent of money and technique: when we eliminate, from the definition of 
production, every source of new value except the producer, namely labour itself. Then: 
(a) the value added by living labour is conserved in circulation: it is destroyed or created only in 
production.7 
(b) the only source of new value is living labour. 
Because of (a), capital stock continues to rise unless the capitalists actually disinvest. Because of (b) the 
effect of this on the profit rate can be offset only by raising the amount of value the capitalists appropriate, 
and this is strictly limited by the growth rate of world living labour. 
 Whilst the law also appears empirically in terms of other concepts of value such as use-value, it 
cannot be theoretically accounted for using these concepts. There is no obvious reason for the profit rate in 
use-value terms to fall as a consequence of accumulation; indeed Okishio’s (1961) famous theorem shows 
it must rise indefinitely unless offset by increasing real wages. 
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 It is a dogma of most writings on Marx that, because the profit rate in use-value terms necessarily 
rises with technical progress, this law cannot hold. This dogma ignores the fact, well-known to 
Keynesians, that the profit rate varies according to the unit of account. The ‘errors’ which the literature 
attributes to Marx’s law arise because in the standard, equilibrium, framework, value is incorrectly 
accounted for and is treated as being destroyed without being consumed; all rates of profit are collapsed 
onto a single rate, the use-value or ‘material’ profit rate. If, however, we interpret Marx’s value concept 
without presupposing equilibrium – and the evidence that this was Marx’s own idea is very substantial – 
then his own theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is logically faultless. 
Conceiving the poverty of nations 
 A general concept is not scientifically useful unless  
(a) it explains a variety of phenomena, not just a single phenomenon, and  
(b) it exhibit the relations between phenomena 
I will now argue that the same concept of value which explains the periodic long-term decline of 
accumulation, also explains the long-term, secular differentiation of nations. 
 At one time the left widely believed that a falling rate of profit was irreversible and would lead to 
a terminal collapse of capitalism. I think the evidence of the 1930s has settled this question. Capitalism did 
survive a shattering and protracted crisis and it would be imprudent to suppose it cannot do so again.  
 The same cannot be said for the differentiation of nations. A large body of evidence shows that the 
global market has produced a prolonged and irreversible divergence between the nations of the world, 
organising them in two groups: 
(a) A small group containing around one fourth of the world’s population and comprising essentially 
those nations that have been rich since the start of this century, plus a tiny number of additions, 
mainly peripheral to the existing centres; 
(b) A much larger group containing three-fourths of the world population. Although this contains two 
groups, middle and low income nations, it shouldn’t be forgotten what ‘middle’ means in this 
context - a living standard between a fifth and a tenth of the advanced country average. 
This secular change in market relations, unlike the decline in the profit rate, has never been reversed and 
has only been interrupted when nations protect or themselves from the world market in capital.8 Moreover 
it is nearly universal: A minute number of nations have risen from poor to rich since 1870. An authoritative 
article by Pritchett(1997:9) sums up the results as follows: 
 …you cannot escape the conclusion that the last 150 years have seen divergence, big time... The 
magnitude of the change in the absolute gaps in per capita incomes between rich and poor is 
staggering. From 1870 to 1990, the average absolute gap in incomes of all countries from the 
leader had grown by an order of magnitude from $1,286 to $12,662 
 Pritchett gives the ratio of the GDP of the richest to the poorest country as 8.7 in 1870, and 45.2 in 
1990. He gives the ratio of the ‘advanced capitalist’ to all other countries as 2.4 in 1870, and 4.5 in 1990. 
This differentiation accelerated markedly after 1980 when the US opened its world trade offensive. 
According to Maddison (1995), Brazil grew by 4.13% per year between 1960 and 1979, and actually 
declined by 0.54 percent between 1980 and 1994. 
 How should we account for these facts? They find almost no explanation within orthodox theory.  
In my view, this is due to a conceptual framework which conceals the fact that distribution is a competitive 
struggle. It is literally inconceivable, in use-value terms, that one country might get poorer because another 
gets richer. Consider figure 2, which compares the output of the major regions of the world in use-value 
terms. 
 It appears as if everyone gains, but some more than others. Since by the application of technology, 
output can increase in principle without limit, there is no obvious reason anyone should fail to benefit from 
it. The framework of ‘development’ economics becomes that of obtaining access to a limitless resource, 
and a failure to do so must be explained not by competition but backwardness; countries are poor not 
because others are rich, but because they have not ‘done as well’. They are made responsible for 
something that has in fact been done to them. 
 However human output is limited, not by external resources but by human production. The world 
cannot produce for more hours than it works. If we express the outcome of the phenomenon of distribution 
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in terms of these hours worked, precisely because this neither rises nor falls in circulation, it becomes clear 
that the market locks nations in battle for battle for a fixed magnitude, which cannot rise faster than the 
number of consumers. There is no such thing as comparative advantage in the acquisition of value: only a 
ruthless struggle to survive. 
 We can observe this as shown in figure 3 by asking how many years of local labour are required, 
in each region, to acquire one year of world labour, a number I call the ‘labour-appropriation ratio’. This 
conveys several phenomena that were not apparent in figure 2. First, the competitive struggle between 
nations emerges clearly. When one goes up, the others go down, and vice versa. 
 Second, the graph shows that 1980 was a turning point in the structure of the world economy. The 
protracted downturn of the Middle East, of Latin America, of South Asia and of Sub-Saharan Africa all 
date from this point; although the data for the transitional economies is available only from 1989, their 
collapse was in large degree the culmination of the US policy offensive launched in 1980.  
 The graph also conveys very clear information about the structure of the world economy. Three 
groups of countries have converged at a labour-appropriation ratio of 8, namely Western Europe, North 
America and South East Asia (Japan and the four tigers). Among these North America shows a clear 
relative decline. Though the graph does not show it because the figures are disaggregated, the industrial 
countries as a whole show a rising trend. 
 A second group bumps along the bottom at a labour-appropriation ratio between 0.2 and 0.1 and is 
also differentiating: China and East Asia/Pacific (a group which excludes China and the South East Asian 
economies) are rising although China’s rise is quite recent and has not restored its 1970 position. South 
Asia – a region with nearly a quarter of the world population – and Sub-Saharan Africa have suffered 
what Pritchett (1997) calls ‘an implosive decline’. 
 A further ‘middle’ group of regions track each other at a ratio between 0.5 and 1. Of these only 
Latin America has held its own: Middle East/North Africa and the transitional economies are in effect 
converging not with the advanced countries, but with the poorest. 
Figure 2: Use-Value Output Per Worker
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Explaining the poverty of nations 
 There are fundamentally two ways to interpret inequality. Either its basic explanation lies in the 
market itself; or in something external such as historical backwardness or national culture. This 
spontaneously racist second conception lies at the heart of much sophisticated economics. 
 However it gives some difficulty with the data. Not least, we should notice the sheer scale of the 
differences. One hour of US labour was by 1995 exchanging for 80 hours of Indian labour on the world 
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market, double what it was in 1980. South Asia contains some of the most ancient civilisations of the 
world. It gave the world numbers, algebra, and some of its greatest mathematicians. It bequeathed material, 
aesthetic, and spiritual riches which nourished the British Empire for three centuries. The idea that its 
present economic state is a consequence of productive, cultural or psychological backwardness is a 
mockery of science. If cultural backwardness explains inequality, what catastrophic cultural event made 
India in 1995 twice as backward as it was in 1980? Asia was neither born with nor achieved this status; it 
was thrust upon it. No other explanation makes sense. 
 We then confront the following problem: if there is no cultural or historical basis for inequality, 
why aren’t the world’s goods distributed equally? And why is the inequality growing? And why are so 
many people actually getting poorer? After all, there is actually now enough to go around. World 
production per head of population now stands at around $3000 in 1987 US dollars. This could house, 
clothe, feed and educate them everyone on the planet. It could protect them from major diseases, maintain 
them in dignified old age, and provide for all those disadvantaged by difference. This output per head 
continues to grow; the equivalent figure in 1970 was $2000. Thus the principal obstacle to human progress 
is no longer technical. The only limit to humanity is humanity itself. There is no absolute need for the 
human race to produce more in order to survive. In consequence it is not empirically sustainable to explain 
national differentiation in terms of factors exogenous to the market. The differentiation is a product of the 
capitalist market; not inadequate absorption of the market, nor resistance to the market, nor even late 
adaption of the market. 
Figure 3: Unequal Value for Equal Work
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 This is particularly clear in the period that opened in 1980. This unleashed a marked acceleration 
in differentiation; but it was precisely the period of greatest extension of the market, of ‘globalisation’. It 
came at the end of the only period when inroads of any kind were made in the gap between nations, 
namely the period 1950-1980 during which the developing nations secured concessions within GATT 
setting at least some limits on the penetration of the world market into their economies (see Freeman 
1998). The gap started to open up again at the precise point when these barriers crumbled before the US 
onslaught. If inequality results from factors exogenous to the market, why did it accelerate so markedly 
when the barriers to the market were removed? 
 The point is also emphasised by the economic performance of China; when we compare its 
performance in use-value terms with the same performance in exchange-value terms, we begin to get some 
glimmering of what might be going on. Between 1980 and 1995, in constant 1987 dollars, Chinese per 
capita output rose by 7.65 times while its monetary value grew by less than the US. This is reflected in a 
declining labour-appropriation ratio. Its technical performance thus directly contradicts its status in the 
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world market. Yet it was China that most strongly resisted and controlled the impact of the world market 
on its domestic economy during the IMF reforms, in contrast to Russia and Eastern Europe which accepted 
orthodox ‘shock therapy’ recipes. 
 The case of China demonstrates that two competing standards of efficiency are at work. By one 
standard - human need - all production is useful which diminishes the labour required to meet human 
requirements. By the other standard - profitability in the world market - only that production is useful 
which makes a money profit. Orthodox theory predicts that these two standards of efficiency are mutually 
compatible: that if investment is governed by the principle of money efficiency, technical efficiency must 
follow. But the actual facts show precisely the reverse; it is only when a principle other than that of money 
efficiency is applied that national differentiation is reversed. 
Combined and uneven accumulation: how value interacts with technical change 
 Distribution, expressed in value terms, is a competitive process. But why should the outcome 
should be uneven? Much literature from the 1960s challenges the orthodox dogma of convergence but to 
explain divergence, falls back on exogeneous factors such as historical specificity. The empirical evidence 
shows that inequality arises ‘whenever and wherever there is a market’. The real problem, therefore, is to 
understand how it arises from market relations alone.  
 The key to this understanding is the form in which capital organises technology, which is both 
exogenous to the capitalist market and a pre-requisite of it.1 Science is ‘produced’ non-capitalistically. But, 
as technology, it is embodied in definite processes of production requiring definite amounts of capital 
investment. Access to technology in the capitalist market demands access to capital.  
 The world market in capital imposes a constraint on the quantity of capital, which is what a nation 
needs in order to avail itself of technology. This sets a fundamental limit on the expansion of the world 
market, precisely because it cannot be altered in circulation - for example, through credit, which may make 
more money available to purchase capital goods, but cannot increase the capital goods themselves. The 
problem of national inequality then reduces to the following: why does capital accumulation distribute 
capital unevenly? 
 I can now clarify an important methodological point. A ‘pure law’ of value applies, independent of 
all other factors: it is always true. But the form in which it appears certainly does depend on other factors. 
National inequality arises from the interaction of accumulation with technical change. Specifically it arises 
from the way technical changes takes place under the free movement of capital. A market where the bulk 
of investment decisions are not dictated by the capital market, as China shows, obeys different laws. The 
law of uneven accumulation is endogenous to the capitalist market in the following sense: when 
investment is organised by the market in capital, technical change cannot escape the limits placed on it by 
the requirement that it produce value. 
 The reason is as follows: different sellers of the same product are obliged to accept a single world 
price, and appropriate different amounts of world value depending on their productivity. A technically 
superior producer makes an above-average profit, yielding an investment fund which amplifies the original 
advantage that led to the excess profit rate. Sources of consistently high profit rates are therefore self-
reinforcing; the process of innovation itself polarises the world into technical haves and have-nots; one 
small group possesses, maintains, and single-mindedly cultivates a near monopoly of the means of 
technical innovation, harnessing the labour of the remainder to fuel this dominance. 
 The unequal distribution of profit rates is the actual motor of capital movement, as first discussed 
by Marx (eg 1976:1024) but more recently by Ernest Mandel (1975). Capital pours into those places where 
it can reach a higher than average profit rate; it thirstily spearheads technical revolution upon technical 
revolution in the process. The most dynamic sectors, which also yield the highest profits, are those who 
innovate the fastest. 
 Accumulation is therefore intrinsically uneven. Uneven accumulation is an endogenous law of the 
                                                     
1
 By analogy with labour, technology is formally but not really subsumed by capital. The present phase has introduced 
a new unique element, which is the attempt, by means of universal intellectual property rights,  to subsume science 
really into capital. This enterprise is in itself fraught with contradiction; for example, it actually involves restraining 
trade in normal commodities, by making it illegal to produce something whose technology is owned by another. 
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capitalist market, overcome only when the capitalist investment mechanism is itself suspended, that is, 
when the market in capital is exogenously overridden. 
What Happened in 1980? 
 We are now in a position to return to the question that opened this paper. Since 1970, the world 
economy, as reported by many observers, has been in a state which we call generalised crisis: low 
accumulation, low general profit rates, mass unemployment, and economic instability. Is there a possible 
exit from this crisis for the market, and if so, what? 
 There is little doubt that the US economy has staged a partial recovery although it is far too early 
to say whether this is stable, and the recovery certainly has not communicated itself to the rest of the 
world. Nevertheless it is important, in order to identify what future options are open, to assess what this 
recovery, as far as it has gone, is based on. 
 The historical evidence is reasonably plain: the date of the turnaround clearly associates it with the 
political offensive of 1980. This was not an endogenous process of the market: it was the outcome of a 
political reorganisation of the world economy initiated in the USA. The process began with the ‘neo-
classical counterrevolution’ (Todaro 1994: 85) which advocated ‘the privatisation of public corporations in 
developed nations and called for the dismantling of public ownership, statist planning, and government 
regulation of economic activities in developing countries’ and secured controlling votes on the World 
Bank and the IMF. Its core argument was that ‘[by] promoting free trade and export expansion, welcoming 
investors from developed countries, and eliminating the plethora of government regulations and price 
distortions in factor, product, and financial markets, both economic efficiency and economic growth 
[would] be stimulated.’ 
 The World Bank and IMF used the lever of debt to secure market reform packages in line with 
free-market principles. This also involved a conscious reorganisation, not just of national markets, but the 
regulatory framework of world trade. The 1986 formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was 
the outcome of a six-year round of trade negotiations held under the auspices of the General Agreement on 
Trades and Tariffs (GATT), the principal post-war world trade regulatory body. The cornerstones of the 
new order were: 
(a) A mandatory framework for world trade with economic sanctions as an automatic penalty for 
violation. Countries could no longer choose whether or not to accept the market; it was now 
imposed upon them with full binding force. 
(b) GATS (General Agreements on Trade and Services) covering one-fifth of all world trade ($1 
trillion) which liberalised trade in services, including notably financial services. Because this 
encapsulated a legal obligation to free capital movement, it imposed, as part of the free-trade 
framework, full participation in the market in capital. 
(c) GATS extended the definition of exports to include production by foreign-owned subsidiaries in 
the host country. Trade regulation was thus extended to the internal market régimes of member 
states; subsidised state social provision is a technically criminal violation of the rights of foreign 
private providers. The offensive to open up capital markets, overriding national sovereignty 
through treaty obligations, continues with the drive to secure the MAI (Multilateral Accord on 
Investment) 
(d) A new trade category of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), an absolute monopoly of advanced 
countries: 0.16% of world patents are currently owned by third world residents (Mihevc 1995). 
Transforming technological know-how into a marketable instrument, IPRs formalise the unequal 
exchange mechanism and provide formal permanent guarantees of advanced country dominance. 
 The WTO’s agenda was the culmination of the aggressive US practice of mandatory unilateral 
sanctions to enforce GATT-agreed arrangements. Bhagwati (1993) records new legislation which 
‘required the US Trade representative to prepare an inventory of foreign trade barriers, establish a priority 
list of countries and their unreasonable practices, and then set deadlines for their removal by the foreign 
countries, and, should they fail to comply, for decisions on retaliation by the United States... [It] is 
characterised by the (wholly distinct) fact that it enables the United States to unilaterally make demands 
for trade concessions by others without offering any matching, reciprocal concessions of its own that 
others might demand in turn.’ 
 The market was thus dramatically extended, as it has on previous occasions, notably 1890-1914 
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when it reached a comparable extent, and in contrast to the onset of the 1945 golden age which was 
characterised by a contraction of the world market, not an expansion. This extension of the world market 
was nevertheless restricted in a number of decisive ways: 
(e) A system of trading blocks - ‘Free Trade Areas’ around the dominant capitalist countries - the EC, 
NAFTA and APEC - gave specific exemption from the measures imposed on all other WTO 
members. 
(f) Large-scale anti-dumping (AD) actions as the preferred protectionist device of the USA, EEC and 
Australia/New Zealand, Before 1986, these were exceptional events. By 1992 they were universal 
for the advanced countries, which initiated 1040 AD actions between 1985 to 1992, over half 
directed against either Eastern Europe (132), the third world (137) or the developing Asian 
countries (297). The non-industrialised countries - three-quarters of the world’s people - initiated 
91. 
(g) The specific new development of IPRs manifests an new, explicit contradiction in the commodity 
form, since trade in knowledge can be achieved only by the restraint of trade in products 
embodying this knowledge. The WTO’s harmonisation offensive against India, for example, 
began by outlawing India production of pharmaceutical products whose patents were less than 
twenty years old, overriding Indian legislation providing for a seven-year patent period. 
 This total package constitutes a new world political framework for trade. It is an extension of the 
market, but also a systematic manipulation of it to restore US profitability. Anti-dumping is baldly 
described by the World Bank as ‘a packaging of protectionism to make it look like something different’ 
(Hoekman and Kostecki 1995). As the latter remark (p178): ‘AD is not about fair play. Its goal is to tilt the 
playing field.’ Though article XXIV of the GATT proposes stringent conditions that a Free Trade Area 
must satisfy, these are never applied. The enthusiastic dismantling of third-world barriers to Northern 
goods has not been reciprocal. What has actually been established is a world market into which the 
advanced countries can sell with the necessary freedom to restore their own profitability at the expense of 
everyone else’s. In particular, the central focus of US and European policy, epitomised by the MAI 
(Multinational Accord on Investments) has been to create a world market in capital; free capital movement 
is the central tenet of the new offensive. The US, running the largest trade deficit in history, is financing its 
recovery by draining the world. 
Endogenous Recovery, Or a New Phase of Imperialism? 
 A genuine recovery of US productivity would be marked, first and foremost, by a US trade 
surplus. The absence of a surplus is the surest indicator that recovery is not grounded in an intrinsic 
product of the market but an exogenous intervention: the subordination of the political world order to US 
profitability. 
 At the very least we have to admit the following; this mechanism has little in common with the 
expansive wave of 1945-65. We confront two distinct processes. The crisis itself was a direct endogenous 
consequence of accumulation. There was no evidence, however, of endogenous recovery. Not only did the 
US recovery arise from an exogenous intervention that kicked in when accumulation broke down, it has 
completely failed to establish the golden-age conditions of 1945, in which US hegemony was accompanied 
by a US surplus that financed world recovery. 
 This has practical conclusions. It means that the price of recovery from general crisis necessarily 
includes a further general reorganisation of the world market, including all that goes with this: a 
reorganisation of its territories, wars of intervention, the forcible imposition of the market relations where 
necessary against the will of the nations concerned, and so on. It means that the exit from one kind of 
catastrophe is, in the last analysis, another kind of catastrophe. The idea that the market itself, if ‘left to 
itself’ will simply restore the conditions for its own existence, does not hold.  
 The evidence confirms Marx’s original judgement of a hundred and thirty years ago: capital sets 
the limits on its own existence. To this we must add that there is, however, no evidence of any intrinsic 
limit on the barbarism and destructiveness of which capital is capable: on the contrary, each new exit from 
general crisis reaches previously inconceivable heights of it. As a ‘way out’ therefore, what is now 
happening can only be regarded by the human race with the most extreme distrust. 
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Notes 
 
1
.Trotsky (1923: 9), cited in Day (1981: 8). 
2
 Even tight linkages do not abolish the distinction, in Marx’s terminology, between formal subordination where an 
external institution conditions another, and real subordination in which each is a condition of existence of the other. 
Labour, as a huge reserve of non-waged direct producers, initially existed as an external condition of existence of the 
market. Relative surplus value made the market a condition of existence of labour, creating a new totality containing 
and transforming both. Cf Marx (1976:1019-1049)  
3
. In symbols K/L, where L=S+V, K is capital stock, S is surplus value and L is total labour. I graphed K/L rather than 
the more usual K/V, the organic composition of capital, to strictly differentiate strictly between effects of distribution 
(variations in S) and accumulation (variations in K). Steindl (1952) points out that Marx himself poses his sharpest 
arguments in terms of K/L. 
4
 For empirical evidence see Freeman (2000) 
5
.See Harrod (1937), Steindl (1952: 262). The law is actually satisfied by money, as well as TSS value, but not by the 
standard interpretation of value: this is why most of the literature alleges that Marx made an error in asserting this law.
 
6
 Let rmax =L/K be the maximum profit rate. Then r’max =(KL’–LK’)/K2. This will be negative until KL’=LK’, that is, r 
=L’/L, the growth rate of the labour force. For profit rates higher than this floor, the maximum rate falls asymptotically 
towards this floor and the actual rate fluctuates under this ceiling. 
7Note that (b) is only (a) expressed another way, since all economic activity falls either into production or into 
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circulation. Note also that production includes the reproduction of the commodity labour-power, and of the capitalist 
class itself. 
8
.I distinguish between isolation from the world market - that is, the products of capital - and separation from the world 
market in capital itself, that is, the capitalist mechanism for allocating investment resources. The decisive strategic 
question for any nation is how take investment decisions without being required to make a competitive money profit in 
an open world market. The decisive tactical question is preserving access to the world’s products while so doing.
 
 
